Foreign aid and international public goods : incentives and strategic behavior by Pedersen, Karl Rolf
Foreign Aid and International Public Goods:
Incentives and Strategic Behavior∗
Karl R. Pedersen Department of Economics
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
Bergen
Abstract
This paper considers a stylized model where a donor and a recipient
government derive utility from a public good (for example consump-
tion among the poor or defense capacity in the recipient country), in
addition to a private good each (for example their own tax-payers’ con-
sumption). The main point is to discuss how the aggregate provision of
funds earmarked for the public good and the distribution of the costs
depend on the pattern of interaction between the two governments.
Both non-cooperative interaction patterns (leading to undersupply of
the public good) and cooperative patterns (leading to Pareto-eﬃcient
outcomes) are discussed. Cooperation is unlikely unless it is backed
by institutions or credible sanctions. Among the non-cooperative in-
teraction patterns the Nash-Cournot type is the best, in the sense that
the supply of the public good is highest. If one of the governments
behave as a (passive) Stackelberg leader (and the other as a follower)
the supply is considerably lower. The distribution of the cost depends
on who the leader is but it may be very uneven. If the Stackelberg
leader government is active and behaves as a principal, making the
other an agent, undersupply is eliminated but the distribution of the
costs become even more uneven.
A donor may have many motives or goals for his presence or activities
in a poor country. An altruistic donor primarily wants to contribute to
∗The author wants to thank Rune Jansen Hagen and Agnar Sandmo for valuable com-
ments.
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reduced poverty and/or increased economic growth. As a result, he engages
in activities like education, road construction, etc. and encourages domestic
decision-makers in the recipient country to do the same. Other donors base
their activities on more narrow self-interest, for example reduced pollution
or deforestation, arming, etc. Accordingly, they engage in activities meant
to reduce pollution or increase the country’s defence capacity, etc., and ask
domestic decision-makers to do the same.
As a rule, the goals of the donor are shared to some extent by impor-
tant domestic decision-makers in the aid-receiving country, for example the
government and other politicians. Ceteris paribus, they also want reduced
poverty, increased economic growth, reduced pollution, stronger defence, etc.
In the discussions below we assume that there are only two actors or
decision-makers: the government in the donor country and the government
in the aid-receiving country.
In many ways, then, the donor and the recipient governments are partners
with common objectives, but it is important to bear in mind that they both
have other objectives as well - and budget constraints (and possibly other
constraints as well). They both know that to the extent they contribute to
the satisfaction of the common goals, there will be a cost in the sense that the
contribution to the satisfaction of other goals will be reduced. As a result,
even though there are common objectives there are conflicting interests when
it comes to the burden-sharing. Each actor definitely wants the other to
carry as much as possible of the cost. It follows that the goods or services
contributing to the satisfaction of the common goals represent what is usually
called international public goods. The actual supply of such goods, and also
the burden-sharing, depend on the nature of the interaction pattern between
the two actors.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section contains the presen-
tation of a simple model and a characterization of the economic situation in
both the donor and the recipient countries if only one of them contributes
to the production of the public good. Then, in section two both countries
contribute but the interaction pattern is non-cooperative. Both the tradi-
tional Nash-Cournot game, resulting in under-supply in the Paretian sense,
and various Stackelberg games, where the under-supply may be even worse,
are discussed. In section three cooperative solutions are discussed. Cooper-
ative solutions are not likely to be implemented unless they are backed by
institutions or credible sanctions.
The paper is meant as an exposition of some basic incentive problems of
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relevance for both recipients and donors of foreign aid, see Pedersen (1997) for
a non-technical survey. Such problems have not been taken seriously in the
traditional literature on development aid, see for example Cassen (1994) or
World Bank (1998b). In addition, the paper may also be read as an introduc-
tion to strategic behavior in the supply of international public goods. Apart
from discussions of free-rider problems related to the private production of
public goods, there is not much about strategic behavior in the literature
on public goods, neither national nor international, see for example Cornes
and Sandler (1996) and Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) for surveys and
discussions.
1 A SIMPLE MODEL
Let V P symbolize whatever argument in the two actors’ (i.e., the govern-
ments’) welfare functions that is common (for example consumption for the
poor, investment, environmental standards or defence expenditures). Let Y P
(≥ 0) be the level of V P in a situation where the two actors are passive, in
the sense that they do not engage in activities meant to contribute to V P .
When the donor government does engage in such activities we shall simply
say that it spends an amount A, financed through a tax on domestic value
added, Y D (À 0) , in the donor country. When the recipient government in-
tervenes actively in order to increase V P it is assumed to spend an amount
T , also financed through a tax on domestic value added, Y R (À 0). We let
θD be the cost of public funds in the donor country, θR be the cost of funds
in the recipient country, and θP be the return of donor and recipient funds
in the production of V P . In order to obtain simple and explicit solutions in
the model exercises to follow, these parameters are assumed to be constant1.
Income in the donor country at the disposal for taxpayers’ consumption
may now be expressed as
V D = Y D − θDA,
Income at the disposal for taxpayers’ consumption in the recipient country
1This means, of course, that the actors’ flexibility is overestimated and, accordingly,
that the results are exaggerated. The principles we want to illustrate, however, remain
valid also for more realistic formulations.
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may be expressed as
V R = Y R − θRT.
In addition, the level of public good, V P , is found as
V P = Y P + θP (T +A) .
We now introduce a welfare function, WD, guiding the donor govern-
ment’s decisions, with V D (the taxpayers’ consumption) and V P (the public
good) as arguments and a corresponding function, WR, with V R (taxpay-
ers’ consumption) and V P , guiding the recipient government’s decisions2. In
order to obtain simple and explicit solutions we simplify by adopting the
following functional forms:
WD
¡
V D, V P
¢
= W
D
+ ρD lnV D + ρP lnV P (with ρD + ρP = 1) and
WR
¡
V R, V P
¢
= W
R
+ γR lnV R + γP lnV P (with γR + γP = 1).
W
D
is a constant that equals zero if the donor government does not
engage in aid activities. It may be positive if there is such engagement; it
represents the benefit derived from being involved. Similarily, W
R
is zero
if the recipient government is not engaged in activities contributing to the
public good but may be positive if it does3.
Such formulations of the welfare functions clearly show that from the
donor government’s and the recipient government’s point of view V P is a
public good. The main point of this paper is to show how the actual supply
of this public good and the distribution of the costs between the taxpayers
in the donor and recipient countries depend on the nature of the interactions
between the two actors4.
2It follows from our formulations that private agents do not voluntarily give contribu-
tions to the public good. They have solved the free-rider problem (at the national level) by
letting the government take care of the supply of public goods. However, the consequences
of private contributions within this framework will be discussed below.
3The actual interpretation of these constants are not important. We may need them
in our simple example in order to obtain interior solutions, i.e., solutions where T 6= 0 and
A 6= 0. If they are set equal to zero corner solutions, i.e., T = 0 or A = 0, may be optimal.
In the real world such corner solutions may be important, but from a theoretical point of
view they are rather uninteresting.
4The two actors’ private goods, V D and V R, may be given very wide interpretations
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However, before we start on that discussion we illustrate the results if
only one of the actors contributes to V P . Those situations are useful reference
points.
1.1 Only domestic contributions
When there is no aid the domestic government maximizes WR with respect
to T for A = 0. The first-order condition, from which the level of T can be
derived, is
∂WR
∂T
= − γ
R
V R
θR + γ
P
V P
θP = 0
The welfare gain derived from the last unit of government income spent on
the public good will equal the welfare cost resulting from the last unit of
public income taxed away from domestic tax-payers.
The results in the recipient-to-be country are the following
TA=0 = γP
Y R
θR
− γRY
P
θP
V PA=0 = θPγP
·
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V RA=0 = θ
RγR
·
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
WRA=0 = W
R
+ γR lnV RA=0 + γP lnV PA=0
The interpretation is clear; the amount collected from the taxpayers and
spent on V P depends on the government’s preferences, the cost of public
funds and the productivity of public funds in the ”production” of V P , in
addition to the taxpayers’ income level and the initial level of V P , Y P . If we
interpret the public good as consumption for the poor, it may be convenient
to interpret Y
R
θR +
Y P
θP as the aggregate income at the government’s disposal,
in addition to taxpayers’ consumption. V D may represent any use of funds that does
not enter the recipient government’s welfare function, for example aid given to another
poor country. V R may be any use of funds not entering the donor government’s welfare
function, for example a new aeroplane or palace for the president.
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given that private income has been transformed into public income. From
the government’s point of view it is optimal to let the weights in the welfare
function (γR and γP = 1 − γR) determine the distribution of this income
between the two groups, V
R
θR = γ
R units to the (rich) taxpayers and V
P
θP = γ
P
to the poor.
The resulting welfare level has been illustrated using the indiﬀerence curve
WRA=0 in figure 1.
The donor-to-be government simply lets all domestic value added be con-
sumed. It benefits, however, from the recipient-to-be government’s contribu-
tion to VP.
V DA=0 = Y
D
WDA=0 = ρD lnV DA=0 + ρP lnV PA=0
Since we want to avoid corner solutions we shall assume that W
D
is so high
that setting A = 0 is not an optimal strategy.
1.2 Only foreign contributions
Without domestic contributions the donor government maximizes WD with
respect to A for T = 0. The first-order condition, which has the same inter-
pretation as the corresponding condition above, is
∂WD
∂A
= − ρ
D
V D
θD + ρ
P
V P
θP = 0
and the results, as perceived by the donor country is
AT=0 = ρP
Y D
θD
− ρDY
P
θP
V PT=0 = θ
PρP
·
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¸
V DT=0 = θ
DρD
·
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¸
WDT=0 = W
D
+ ρD lnV DT=0 + ρP lnV PT=0
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The amount given in aid depends on the donor government’s preferences,
its cost of public funds, and the return of aid in the production of V P , in
addition to the income level in the donor country and the initial level of V P .
The indiﬀerence curve labelled WDT=0 reflects the resulting welfare level.
In the receiving country the entire value added is consumed by the po-
tential taxpayers but the government derives benefits from the donor’s con-
tribution to VP .
V RT=0 = Y
R
WRT=0 = γR lnV RT=0 + γP lnV PT=0
Again we shall assume that the constant in the welfare function, W
R
this
time, is so high that setting T = 0 is not optimal.
_____
Given our assumptions, for the corner solutions above to be realistic they
must be imposed by some exogenous factors, specifying that one of the actors
is not allowed to contribute to the public good. Without such a restriction
both will end up as contributors. When they both contribute they may, to
some extent, crowd out each others contributions. There may even be crowd-
ing in. It all depends on the nature of the interaction between them. The
interaction pattern will also determine how much each actor will contribute
and the level of the total contribution.
Actually, we shall discuss equilibria where both T and A are positive as
well as equilibria where one of them may be negative. A negative T , means
that some of the aid ends up as consumption for the (rich) taxpayers in the
recipient country - not at all an unrealistic scenario. A negative A means
that some of the taxes paid by the taxpayers in the recipient country, T , ends
up as consumption in the donor country. This situation is not necessarily
too unrealistic in a situation where the recipient government owes some debt
to the donor government. A negative A will then simply mean that some
debt is repaid. We shall assume that in such situationsW
R
andW
D
are high
enough to make sure that none of the actors want to withdraw from their
engagement and that none of them wants to exclude the other.
We first discuss interaction patterns predicted by non-cooperative game
theory, where the solutions reflect serious Pareto ineﬃciencies, in the sense
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that the aggregate contribution to the public good is too low. In addition,
some of the solutions lead to very uneven distribution between the donor and
the recipient governments of the aggregate cost of providing the public good.
Then we show how genuine cooperation may reduce (and actually elimi-
nate) these problems. However, since the two actors have incentives to cheat,
cooperation is not likely to happen.
2 NON-COOPERATION
2.1 Nash-Cournot
The traditional way of modelling non-cooperative supply of public goods is
as a Nash-Cournot game (see Cornes and Sandler (1996) for an introduction
and a survey). In a situation where the interaction pattern may be char-
acterized as a non-cooperative game of the Nash-Cournot type each actor
does the best he can, taking the other actor’s contribution as given. The
donor government maximizes WD with respect to A taking T as given and
the recipient government maximizesWR with respect to T taking A as given.
The first-order conditions and the corresponding reaction functions A (T )N
and T (A)N which can be derived directly from those conditions, are the
following.
The donor:
∂WD
∂A
=
ρPθP
V P
− ρ
DθD
V D
= 0
A (T )N = ρ
P Y
D
θD
− ρD
µ
Y P
θP
+ T
¶
The recipient:
∂WR
∂T
=
γPθP
V P
− γ
RθR
V R
= 0
T (A)N = γ
P Y
R
θR
− γR
µ
Y P
θP
+A
¶
Each actor will tend to set his own marginal welfare gain from the supply
of the public good equal to the marginal welfare cost from taxation (and
reduced taxpayers’ consumption). It is clear in our simple example that aid
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is perfectly fungible and that the two actors tend to crowd out each other’s
activities meant to contribute to the public good: A0 (T ) ≡ ∂A∂T = −ρ
D and
T 0 (A) ≡ ∂T∂A = −γR. A share ρD of domestic expenditures on V P , i.e., of T ,
ends up as private consumption in the donor country. Similarily, a share γR
of A ends up as private consumption among the taxpayers in the recipient
country.
The reaction functions have been illustrated in figure 1. The slope of the
recipient government’s reaction function is T 0 (A) = −γR and we know that
−1¿ T 0 (A)¿ 0. The slope of the donor’s reaction function is 1
A0(T ) = −
1
ρD¿ −1 and we know that it is clearly steeper than the recipient government’s
reaction function.
The slopes of the recipient government’s indiﬀerence curves are (see the
appendix)
dT
dA
¯¯¯¯
WR
= −
γP θP
V P
γP θP
V P
− γRθR
V R
From the first-order condition above we see that along the reaction function
the denominator is zero, i.e., ∂W
R
∂T =
γP θP
V P
− γRθR
V R
= 0, so that the slope tends
to infinity (the indiﬀerence curve is vertical). The slope is positive above the
reaction function where ∂W
R
∂T ¿ 0 and negative below the reaction function
because ∂W
R
∂T À 0.
The slope of the donor government’s indiﬀerence curves are
dT
dA
¯¯¯¯
WD
= −
ρP θP
V P
− ρDθD
V D
ρP θP
V P
Along the reaction function the first-order condition, ∂W
D
∂A =
ρP θP
V P
− ρDθD
V D
= 0,
tells us that the numerator equals zero and so does the slope (the indiﬀerence
curves are horisontal). It is positive to the right of the reaction function,
where ∂W
D
∂A ¿ 0 and negative to the left of the reaction function where
∂WD
∂A À 0.
The reaction functions give us two equations that can be used to calculate
the levels of A and T .
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A =
1
1− ρDγR
·
ρP
Y D
θD
− ρDγP
µ
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¶¸
T =
1
1− ρDγR
·
γP
Y R
θR
− γRρP
µ
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¶¸
The resulting levels of V P , V R, and V D are easily calculated once A and
T are known:
V P =
θPγPρP
1− ρDγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V R =
θRγRρP
1− ρDγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V D =
θDρDγP
1− ρDγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
The result has been illustrated as point a in figure 1 where also the indif-
ference curves have been drawn, WDa for the donor government and W
R
a for
the recipient government.
Figure 1 about here
It is still convenient to consider Y
D
θD +
Y R
θR +
Y P
θP as the aggregate amount,
measured in a common numeraire to be spent on private consumption among
the taxpayers in the two countries and the public good, for example consump-
tion for the poor. V
P
θP units (or the share
γP ρP
1−ρDγR ) are spent on the public
good. V
R
θR (the share
γRρP
1−ρDγR ) units end up as consumption by the taxpayers
in the recipient country. V
D
θD units (
ρDγP
1−ρDγR ) are being consumed by taxpayers
in the donor country.
It follows, ceteris paribus, that the amount spent on V P depends posi-
tively on γ
P
γR and
ρP
ρD , i.e. the relative weighs of the public good in the welfare
functions. However, because of the non-cooperative structure of the game it
is also the case that the amount spent on V R depends positively on ρ
P
ρD and
the amount spent on V D depends positively on γ
P
γR . The more important the
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public good is perceived by the donor government, the lower the the amount
spent on that good by the recipient government and the higher the taxpay-
ers’ consumption in the recipient country will tend to be. Similarily, if the
recipient government cares much for the public good, the donor government
will spend less on that good than if the recipient government had cared less.
We see from figure 1 that there are many combinations of A and T where
both actors are better oﬀ (the shaded area) than in point a. Those combi-
nations also reflect higher aggregate contribution to the public good. Both
actors, however, are bound to loose from unilateral increases (as well as
reductions) of their contributions, i.e., they end up on indiﬀerence curves
reflecting lower utility.
The Nash-Cournot solution, where the two actors take each other’s de-
cision as given, is definitely not the best. As will be shown below, among
non-cooperative interaction patterns, however, worse solutions easily come
to mind, especially if one of the actors can be characterized as a passive
Stackelberg leader and the other a Stackelberg follower.
A digression on (non-)neutrality: Since the productivities of aid and do-
mestic transfers are equal, θP , the traditional neutrality results (Bergstrom,
Blume, and Varian (1986)) follow - in the sense that whether the donor gov-
ernment gives aid earmarked for the production of public goods or general
transfers to the recipient government, is of no importance in the present
context. Of course, if those productivities had diﬀered between them, this
type of neutrality would not hold (Cornes and Sandler (1996)). A general
transfer to the recipient government would be more valuable for all than the
same amount earmarked for the production of the public good if the recipient
government’s productivity was higher than that of the donor, and vice versa.
However, it is interesting to observe that the neutrality result has to
do with transfers of income in the hands of the donor government to the
”production” of the public good or to the recipient government, i.e., after
the correction for a cost of public funds diﬀerent from unity. When the cost
of public funds is higher (or lower) than unity, it is important to distinguish
between public and private aid.
If we assume that private aid is given from taxpayers in the donor country5
to taxpayers in the recipient country (a lump-sum transfer between taxpay-
5Because of the free-rider problem private contributions may be negligible in the real
world.
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ers), the net eﬀect depends on the relative levels of the cost of public funds:
We see that if Y D is reduced by one unit and Y R is increased by one unit,
taxpayers’ consumption in both countries, V D and V R, as well as aggregate
production of the public good, V P , will increase only as long as the cost of
public funds in the donor country, θD, is higher than the cost in the recipient
country, θR. Since such a transfer will cause the aid from the government, A,
to go down the aggregate tax level in the donor country goes down as well.
Accordingly, there is an eﬃciency gain. In the recipient country, on the other
hand, the aggregate tax level must increase, leading to an eﬃciency loss. As
long as θD À θR the gain in the donor country will outweigh the loss in the
recipient country. In the real world it seems more likely that θD ¿ θR so
that private aid of the type in question will be directly counterproductive.
Maybe a more natural way of thinking about private aid is to let it con-
tribute directly to the public good. If we let the public good be consumption
for the poor, there are at least two ways of doing that: The aid can either
be given directly to the poor as an income increase, i.e., as increased Y P ,
or it can be given in the same way as government aid, as a contribution to
the ”production” of V P 6. In the first case the result can be found formally
in exactly the same way as the results of a private transfer to the taxpayers
in the recipient country. Both V D, V R, and V P will increase as a result of
a combined increase of Y P and a reduction of Y D as long as θD À θP , i.e.,
as long as the cost of funds in the donor country exceeds the productivity of
the two governments’ contributions to the ”production” of consumption for
the poor. In the second case all the three interesting variables will increase
if θD exceeds unity, i.e., as long as taxes collected in the donor country are
distortionary7.
2.2 The passive Stackelberg leaders
As mentioned above, usually the non-cooperative supply of public goods
is modelled as a Nash-Cournot game. When the actors are relatively few,
however, there is no reason why one (or more) of them should not think
6Private transfers from the tax-payers in the recipient country may, of course, be treated
in a similar way.
7This conclusion will be reinforced if private aid is more eﬀective than public aid, in
the sense that θP is higher for private aid.
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more strategically, for example as in a Stackelberg game (see for example
Gibbons (1992)). When in a game between two actors one is characterized
as a Stackelberg follower and the other a Stackelberg leader, one of them
(the follower) still takes the other’s (the leader’s) decision as given, but the
other (the leader) incorporates the other’s (the follower’s) reaction to his own
decision. When we say that the leader is passive, it simply means that he
lets the follower do whatever he finds best, given his own preferences. The
active leader, however, discussed below, intervenes directly in the sense that
he dictates what the follower is expected to do.
Who is actually the leader and who is the follower in the donor-recipient
relationship? The answer is not at all clear and it may even be time and
context specific.
In the aid literature, very often it is assumed that the donor is the leader
and the recipient is the follower, especially when conditionality is involved.
However, conditionality is not always adhered to by the recipient and in re-
ality, the donor may end up as the follower, see the discussion of the Samar-
itan’s dilemma below.
Also, the ”new” ideas in multilateral organizations about partnerships for
development8, based on recipent country ”ownership” may seem to recom-
mend handing over the leadership to the recipient country’s government and
accept the position as followers for the donors.
2.2.1 The donor as the leader and the recipient government as
the follower
The follower recipient government still takes the inflow of aid as given and
is, accordingly, on its reaction curve. The leader donor government, on the
other hand, incorporates the recipient’s reaction to its own action. Using the
recipient government’s reaction function above it calculates the ”production”
of the public good as a function of its own contribution as V P = Y P +
θP (T +A) = θPγP
h
Y R
θR +
Y P
θP +A
i
. When it determines how much aid to
give, it knows that a share of it, γR, in reality ends up as consumption for the
taxpayers in the recipient country. Only the share γP = 1− γR goes to the
goal for which it is earmarked. This certainly reduces the donor’s willingness
8See for example World Bank (1998a).
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to give in our simple example. The first-order condition determining A may
now be written as
dWR
dA
=
ρP θPγP
V P
− ρ
DθD
V D
= 0
and the results are
A = ρP Y
D
θD
− ρD
µ
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¶
T =
¡
1− γRρP
¢ Y R
θR
− γRρP
µ
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¶
V P = θPγPρP
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V R = θRγRρP
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V D = θDρD
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
These results have been indicated as point b in figure 1. It is clear that
the amount given by the leader donor is lower than the amount given in the
Nash-Cournot case above and that the expenditures of the recipient govern-
ment is higher. The burden of providing for V P has been changed in favour
of the donor. Accordingly, taxpayers’ consumption in the donor country
has increased and taxpayers’ consumption in the recipient country has been
reduced. However, the aggregate supply of the public good, for example con-
sumption for the poor, has been somewhat reduced (γPρP ¿ γP ρP
1−ρDγR ). The
donor government ends up being better oﬀ (see the indiﬀerence curve WDb )
while the recipient government is worse oﬀ (the indiﬀerence curve WRb ).
Again, we see that there are many combinations of A and T where both
the donor and the recipient government are better oﬀ. However, the recipient
goverment is on its reaction curve, so that its indiﬀerence curve is vertical -
indicating that a unilateral increase of T will reduce its welfare level. The
donor government’s indiﬀerence curve has negative slope (from the first-order
condition we know that ρ
P θP
V P
− ρDθD
V D
À 0) indicating that a unilateral increase
of A, if it goes to the public good in its entirety, will cause its welfare level to
increase. It knows, however, that if A is increased by one unit the recipient
government will reduce T by γR units along its reaction function so that only
the share γP in reality ends up contributing to the public good. As a result,
from the donor’s perspective the welfare level will be reduced.
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2.2.2 The recipient government as the leader and the donor as
the follower
In this case the donor government takes the recipient government’s eﬀort, T ,
as given and is, therefore on its reaction curve. The recipient government,
however, knows that the donor will give less the more itself contributes to
V P . Using the donor government’s reaction function above it calculates the
”production” of the public good as a function of its own contribution as V P =
Y P + θP (T +A) = θPρP
h
Y D
θD +
Y P
θP + T
i
. It knows that only a share ρP of
T ends up contributing to V P . The rest, ρD = 1− ρP ends up in the pockets
of the donor country’s tax-payers. The first-order condition determining T
is
dWD
dT
=
γPθPρP
V P
− γ
RθR
V R
= 0
and the results in this case are
A =
¡
1− ρDγP
¢ Y D
θD
− ρDγP
µ
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¶
T = γP Y
R
θR
− γR
µ
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¶
V P = θPγPρP
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V R = θRγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V D = θDρDγP
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
These results have been indicated as point c in figure 1. It is interesting
to observe that letting the donor become the follower and the recipient the
leader does not aﬀect the aggregate amount spent on the public good in
our simple example, i.e., the level of V P is independent of whether it is the
donor or the recipient who is the leader. The burden-sharing, however, has
changed. Now the amount spent on V D is lower that in the Nash-Cournot
situation, while the amount spent on V R is higher, i.e., taxpayers in the
donor country are worse oﬀ and taxpayers in the recipient country are better
oﬀ. The recipient government is undoubtedly better oﬀ (see the indiﬀerence
curve WRc ) while the donor is worse oﬀ (the indiﬀerence curve W
D
c ).
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Again we see that there exist many combinations of A and T where both
actors are better oﬀ and the aggregate supply of the public good is higher.
From the donor’s point of view, however, since the indiﬀerence curve is ho-
risontal in point c, a unilateral increase of A will cause the welfare level to go
down. The slope of the recipient government’s indiﬀerence curve is negative
(from the first-order condition it follows that γ
P θP
V P
− γRθR
V R
À 0). As a result
a one unit increase of T ending up as increased supply of the public good
in its entirety, means higher welfare. The donor government, however, re-
duces its contribution along its reaction curve, so that in reality the recipient
government’s welfare goes down if it increases T unilaterally.
Answers to the neutrality question are the same when the two govern-
ments play a Stackelberg game as when they are engaged in a game of the
Nash-Cournot type discussed above. Given the results derived in Jayarman
and Kanbur (1999) in a situation where the the cost of public funds equals
unity this is no surprise. Similar results can also be found in Cornes and
Sandler (1996).
A digression on fungibility: Neutrality presupposes that the donor’s con-
tribution is perfectly fungible, in the sense that it is considered as a general
increase of the recipient’s aggregate funds. Perfect fungibility, as usually
defined, means that it is up to the recipient to determine how the donor’s
contribution is actually used, no matter how it is earmarked initially. In the
aid literature the debate on fungibility goes back at least to Singer (1965)
who considered fungibility at the micro or project level; aid earmarked for a
specific project may easily end up financing another (less valuable) project
within the same program (for example education). Later contributions have
considered what might be called fungibility at the program level and fungi-
bility at the macro level. Fungibility at the program level refers to situations
where aid earmarked for one program (for example education) may be trans-
ferred to another program (for example health). As long as both programs
contribute to the supply of goods or services from which the donor derives
some utility such fungibility is not necessarily a problem leading to reduced
eﬀectiveness of aid. What we call fungibility at the macro level, however, is
meant to capture situations where aid may be trensferred to purposes from
which the donor derives no utility (for example a new palace for the polit-
ical leaders or in the model above: consumption for the (rich) tax-payers).
Actual diversion at the macro level may have dramatic and negative eﬀects
on the eﬀectiveness of aid as perceived by the donor and may turn out to
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be the main reason for the apparent lack of eﬀectiveness of development aid,
see Boone (1996) and Burnside and Dollar (2000).
Whether aid is fungible or not is not the important question. The impor-
tant questions from the donor’s point of view must be whether diversion of
funds away from the purpose for which it is earmarked actually takes place
and his perception of the value of its actual use9. Actual diversion and the
purpose for which it is used of course depends on the recipient’s preferences,
competence, etc. but what is important to notice in our context is that it
also depends critically on the nature of the interaction pattern between the
two actors. In many ways the focus of this paper could be said to be actual
diversion of aid at the macro level. Hagen (2002) discusses fungibility at the
program level within a similar game-theoretic context. He claims that we
lack a good definition of fungibility. His suggestion is that such a definition
should focus on the relative distribution of influence - between the donor and
the recipient - over the actual outcome.
2.3 The active Stackelberg leaders
The diﬀerence between the active and the passive Stackelberg leaders is that
the active leader intervenes directly in the follower’s decision-making. The
leader becomes the principal and the follower becomes the agent operating
more or less on behalf of the principal. In this situation it becomes crucial
for the principal to figure out how much he can get out of the agent. That
depends on the agents’ reservation utility or welfare level, i.e., his perception
of the worst scenario the principal can possibly put him in. The principal
oﬀers a contract based on the maximization of his own welfare and the agent
accepts the contract because he would be worse oﬀ if he did not.
The analyses below presuppose that the agent’s actions can be monitored
by the principal10 and that he is able to enforce the contract.
2.3.1 The donor as the principal and the recipient government as
the agent
Let WRd symbolize the recipient government’s perception of the worst case,
here assumed to reflect a welfare level which is lower than the one obtained
in a situation where the donor government is a passive Stackelberg leader,
9See Devarajan and Swaroop (2000) for a short survey of the fungibility literature.
10Se Pedersen (1995) for a discussion of asymmetric information in this context.
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WRb above. The donor government will now simply ”buy” extra domestic
expenditures on the public good in return for aid along the recipient gov-
ernment’s indiﬀerence curve WRd in figure 1. The problem is simply to max-
imize WD = W
D
+ ρD ln
¡
Y D − θDA
¢
+ ρP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
with re-
spect to A and T given the constraint that WR =W
R
+γR ln
¡
Y R − θRT
¢
+
γP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
> WRd . Letting λ represent the Lagrange multiplier
the contract oﬀered by the donor (and accepted by the recipient government)
is characterized by the following first-order conditions:
W
R
+ γR ln
¡
Y R − θRT
¢
+ γP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
−WRd = 0
ρP θP
V P
− ρ
DθD
V D
+ λ
·
γP θP
V P
¸
= 0
ρP θP
V P
+ λ
·
γP θP
V P
− γ
RθR
V R
¸
= 0
It follows that −
ρP θP
V P
−ρ
DθD
VD
ρP θP
V P
= −
γP θP
V P
γP θP
V P
−γRθR
VR
, i.e., that the slopes of the two
actors’ indiﬀerence curves must be the same. The resulting combination of A
and T has been illustrated as point d in figure 1. Now we see that no Pareto-
improvements exist: there are no combination of T and A where both actors
are better oﬀ.
In many ways the situation just described is closely related to the rela-
tionship between a donor and a recipient when the donor tries to impose
some kind of conditionality. In the resulting contract the donor government
”buys” contributions to the public good from the recipient government, T .
The reward is its own contribution, A. This is undoubtedly the best possible
result for the donor government.
In the next section the recipient government has the upper hand and
designs a contract where conditionality is imposed on the donor.
2.3.2 The recipient government as the principal and the donor as
the agent
Assume that the recipient government is able to keep the donor at the welfare
level, WDe , that is lower than the welfare level obtained when the recipient
government is a passive Stackelberg leader, WDc . The government will ”buy”
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extra aid in return for domestic contributions along the indiﬀerence curve
WDe in figure 1. The recipient government’s problem is to maximize W
R =
W
R
+ γR ln
¡
Y R − θRT
¢
+ γP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
with respect to T and A
provided that WD = W
D
+ ρD ln
¡
Y D − θDA
¢
+ ρP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
>
WDe . The first-order conditions are
W
D
+ ρD ln
¡
Y D − θDA
¢
+ ρP ln
¡
Y P + θP (A+ T )
¢
−WDe = 0
γP θP
V P
− γ
RθR
V R
+ µ
·
ρP θP
V P
¸
= 0
γP θP
V P
+ µ
·
ρP θP
V P
− ρ
DθD
V D
¸
= 0
Again the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves must be equal so that no Pareto-
improvements exist. The results have been illustrated in figure 1, as point
e. This time it is the recipient who imposes conditionalities on the donor
government and obtains, thereby, the best possible result from his point of
view.
A digresssion on the Samaritan’s dilemma. Donor-imposed conditional-
ity does not always work11. In reality, often the active Stackelberg leader
(i.e., principal) donor may seem to end up as a follower in a game where the
recipient behaves as a passive Stackelberg leader. One plausible way of ex-
plaining that observation is based on insights about time inconsistency from
Buchanan (1975), in a situation where there is no way of enforcing a con-
tract, see Pedersen (1996, 1997, 2001) and Svensson (2000) for applications
of relevance in this context.
Given a more realistic time structure the main argument may be spelled
out in the following way. Step 1 : The leader donor government oﬀers a
contract specifying the amount of aid to be given and the amount expected
to be spent on the public good by the recipient government. If the donor
believes that the recipient will not cheat, the terms of the contract will be
those chosen by the active leader donor, see point d in figure 1. Step 2 :
The recipient government determines how much actually to take from the
taxpayers and spend on the public good. Since the donor government has
11See for example Hopkins, Powell, Roy and Gilbert (2000) for a World Bank perspective
on conditionality.
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no way of enforcing the contract the recipient government knows it will not
be punished for non-compliance but in addition - and this is what actually
traps the donor - it anticipates that there will be a third step where the
donor government will come in with additional contributions once it has
seen the actual contribution of the recpient, i.e. the recipient government
anticipates the donor government to end up on its reaction curve12. As
a result, given that the recipient government is rational it will behave as
our passive Stackelberg leader, spending much less on the public good than
specified in the contract. Step 3 : Once the donor government has observed
the actual contribution of the recipient, the best it can do, according to its
own preferences, is actually what the recipient government has anticipated
it to do, see point c in figure 1. Ex post it is optimal to give more aid then
specified in the contract ex ante.
The donor does not have to be a Samaritan, i.e., have altruistic motives,
to be confronted with this problem. It may be relevant no matter the exact
nature of the public good13. To avoid the problem the donor has to develop
credible commitments, making it in his own interest not to re-enter the stage
in step 3 but this may be very diﬃcult.
3 COOPERATION
From the discussions above we see that only the situations where one of the
actors is what we have called an active Stackelberg leader and the other a
follower do we find Pareto-optimal allocations (or at least Pareto-optimal
contracts), characterized by the the fact that the two actors’ indiﬀerence
curves are tangential to each other. That is no accident, because in many
ways the principal and the agent cooperate and in equilibrium it is impossible
to increase the welfare level of one of them without reducing that of the other.
The two situations where one of the actors is an active Stackelberg leader
are the extremes, in the sense that the two actors cooperate but the burden
is shared in a way that leads to maximum inequality in the distribution
of the burden of contributiong to the public good. In principle, any other
12Without this anticipation the recipient government would take the donor’s contribu-
tion in step 1 as given and, accordingly, end up on its own reaction curve.
13Of course, an active Stackelberg leader recipient may be confronted with a similar
dilemma.
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distribution between the two extremes is also possible. Let us, therefore, try
to characterize such outcomes.
3.1 Centralized decision-making
Assume that the two actors agree to cooperate, in the sense that they agree to
maximize, with respect to T and A, the weighted sum of the donor’s and the
recipient’s welfare, W = βDWD+βRWR. The weights, βD and βR = 1−βD
will equal 0.5 if the cooperation is on equal terms14. When βD tends to 1
(and βR to 0), the resulting allocation will be identical to the one discussed
above with the donor government as the active Stackelberg leader. If βR
tends to 1 (and βD to 0) we are back to the situation where the recipient
government is the active Stackelberg leader.
The first-order conditions:
dW
dA
= βD ∂W
D
∂A
+ βR∂W
R
∂A
= 0
= βD
µ
−ρ
DθD
V D
+
ρP θP
V P
¶
+ βR
γP θP
V P
dW
dT
= βR
∂WR
∂T
+ βD
∂WD
∂T
= 0
= βR
µ
−γ
RθR
V R
+
γPθP
V P
¶
+ βD
ρPθP
V P
Disregarding the βs the main diﬀerence from a situation where there is no
cooperation is that it is the aggregate welfare eﬀects that counts, i.e., the
sum of the two actors’ perception of the gains from increased supply of the
public good15.
14We do not ask where the weights in this aggregate welfare function come from. Re-
alistically speaking they would have to come as the result of some international political
process within a global governance system. Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) contains
interesting discussions of related questions.
15If we let βD = βR = 0.5 the first-order conditions can be expressed as
¡
ρP + γP
¢ θP
V P =
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These first-order conditions give us two equations to determine the result-
ing level of A and T . In order to understand the consequences of cooperation,
we illustrate the two equations graphically in figure 2 as
A (T )C =
1
βD + βRγP
·¡
βDρP + βRγP
¢ Y D
θD
− βDρD
µ
Y P
θP
+ T
¶¸
and
T (A)C =
1
βR + βDρP
·¡
βRγP + βDρP
¢ Y R
θR
− βRγR
µ
Y P
θP
+A
¶¸
They should, of course, not be interpreted as individual reaction functions
unless both actors internalize the eﬀect of their actions on the other’s welfare.
The resulting levels of A and T can be found where the two curves intersect,
see point f in figure 2 for a situation where βR = βD = 0.5. That is also where
the two actors’ indiﬀerence curves are tangential to each other, dT
dA
¯¯
WR
=
1
dA
dT |WD :
−
γP θP
V P
γP θP
V P
− γRθR
V R
= −
ρP θP
V P
− ρDθD
V D
ρP θP
V P
=
βR
βD
γP
ρP
À 0
and no Pareto improvements exist.
It is possible to calculate the resulting levels of A an T , and once that is
done, it is straight-forward to divide the aggregate income among the three
competing purposes. Contributions to the public good:
ρDθD
VD =
γRθR
V R . The sum of the two actors’ perception of the welfare gain of the last unit of
income spent on the public good should equal the welfare cost of the last unit of income
collected from tax-payers in the donor country (as perceived by the donor dovernment)
and the welfare cost of the last unit collected in the recipient country (as perceived by
the recipient government). Expressed in this way our results can be interpreted as an
international version of Samuelson’s (1954) theory of public goods in a world without
lump-sum taxation. A more direct generalization of Samuelson’s theory can be found in
Sandmo (2002).
22
A =
¡
βR + βDρP
¢ Y D
θD
− βDρD
·
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
=
Y D
θD
− βDρD
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
T =
¡
βD + βRγP
¢ Y R
θR
− βRγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y P
θP
¸
=
Y R
θR
− βRγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
The resulting aggregate contribution to the public good and taxpayers’ con-
sumption in the two countries:
V P = θP
¡
βRγP + βDρP
¢ ·Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V R = θRβRγR
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
V D = θDβDρD
·
Y D
θD
+
Y R
θR
+
Y P
θP
¸
We see that ceteris paribus the weights βD and βR = 1−βD now determine
how the burden related to the ”production” of the public good, V P , is divided
between the tax-payers in the donor and the recipient countries. If γP 6= ρP
these weights also determine the aggregate level of V P . If γP ¿ ρP the
aggregate level of V P depends positively on βD. This is the case where the
donor government cares more for the public good, for example consumption
for the poor, than the recipient. If γP À ρP and the recipient government
cares more for the public good than the donor, V P depends negatively on
βD. If γP = ρP the level of V P is independent of those weights.
Figure 2 about here
Disregarding any internalization of external eﬀects, we see from figure 2
that if the alternatives are cooperation with weights βD = 1 − βR = 0.5
(point f) and non-cooperation of the Nash-Cournot type (point a) both ac-
tors would try to cheat if we start in point f. Both will see their welfare level
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increase if they unilaterally reduce their contribution to the public good. If
they take each other’s actions as given the new stable equilibrium will be in
point a, where they both are worse oﬀ and the aggregate contribution to the
public good much lower. Cooperation will not survive if it is not backed by
institutions or credible sanctions, i.e., if the contract resulting from the max-
imization of the weighted sum of the two actors’ welfare cannot be enforced.
It is diﬃcult to see how such free-rider problems can be solved without a well
functioning global governance system. We have assumed that the free-rider
problems at the national level has been solved in both the countries involved
in the supply of public goods in our set-up. As a description of the real
world that may be an exaggeration but in many ways one of the greatest
achievements of the nation-state has been the provision of collective action
rules to overcome such problems. Similar rules are in short supply at the
international level.
3.2 Decentralized decision-making and (partial) inter-
nalization
Of course, if as mentioned above both actors fully internalize the benefits
their own action has for the other, then A (T )C and T (A)C should be con-
sidered as individual reaction functions. Then point f would be just as stable
as any non-cooperative equilibrium discussed above. Actually, in that case
it is a Pareto-optimal non-cooperative equilibrium.
It is also possible to think of some partial internalization, leadig to reac-
tion functions between those with subscript N (with absolutely no internal-
ization) and those with subscript C (with full internalization), resulting in a
stable equilibrium where the two lines intersect.
Observe that if βD = 1 (and βR = 0) in the A (T )C -equation and β
R = 1
(and βD = 0) in the T (A)C -equation, we are back to the non-cooperative
reaction functions A (T )N and T (A)N used above. Partial internalization
would mean than the donor lets βR be positive and, accordingly, lets βD
fall below unity while the recipient government lets βD be positive and sets
βR below unity. Once the degree of internalization, i.e., parameter values of
the βs for the two actors, has been specified, the two equations A (T )C and
T (A)C, can easily be used to derive the resulting levels of A and T.
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Maybe an interesting special case could be the one where the donor gov-
ernment fully internalizes the benefits of its actions for the recipient govern-
ment but where the recipient does not internalize the consequenses for the
donor at all. Then the actual reaction function for the donor would be A(T )C
while the recipient’s reaction function would be T (A)N . The equilibrium has
been illustrated as point g in figure 2 where, of course, the donor’s contri-
bution to the public good is very high compared to the contribution of the
recipient.
Maybe Scandinavian aid to Tanzania, under President Nyerere, could be
interpreted in this way. Scandinavian social democrats obviously considered
him as their close relative and ideological spear-head in Africa.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper we have considered a stylized model where two governments
(a donor and a recipient) derive utility from a public good (for example
poverty reduction) in addition to a private good each (for example their
own tax-payers’ consumption). The main point has been to show how the
aggregate provision of funds for the public good and the distribution of the
cost depend on the interaction pattern between the two governments. We
have considered both non-cooperative and cooperative interaction patterns.
Even though we have focused on foreign aid, the exercises may also be read as
an introduction to strategic behavior in the provision of international public
goods in a wider sense.
Realistically speaking, without an international governance system Pareto-
eﬃcient cooperation of the type discussed in this paper is ruled out. The same
may be true for what we have called active Stackelberg leadership, at least
if we stick to our rather macro-economic frame of reference. As a result,
we are left with non-cooperative interaction patterns in most cases and, ac-
cordingly, undersupply of international public goods in the Paretian sense.
How the non-cooperative game is actually played may vary from case to case.
To the extent that questions related to incentives and strategic behavior are
taken up in the literature on foreign aid or international public goods, usually
a Nash-Cournot type of game is assumed. There is, however, no a priori rea-
son to disregard Stackelberg type of behavior, especially in situations where
the number of actors are relatively few. The actual type of behavior really
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matters. As shown in this paper, Stackelberg interaction patterns tend to
keep down the actual supply of the public good and make the distribution of
the cost more uneven compared to the Nash-Cournot interaction pattern.
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APPENDIX
This appendix is meant for readers who are not familiar with indiﬀerence
curves of the type used in this paper.
The donor government’s indiﬀerence curves
The welfare or utility function of the donor government is expressed as
WD =W
D
+ ρD lnV D + ρP lnV P ( with ρD + ρP = 1)
where
V D = Y D − θDA and
V P = Y P + θP (T +A)
In order to derive an indiﬀerenc curve - which by definition illustrates the
combinations of A and T which give the same utility or welfare level - we
diﬀerentiate the welfare function with respect to the two interesting variables
and set the total diﬀerential equal to zero.
dWD =
∂WD
∂A
dA+
∂WD
∂T
dT = 0
where the partial derivatives are
∂WD
∂A
= − ρ
D
V D
θD + ρ
P
V P
θP
∂WD
∂T
=
ρP
V P
θP
The partial derivative with respect to T is always positive: The donor gov-
ernment will always be better oﬀ if the recipient government increases its
contribution to the public good. The sign of the partial derivative with re-
spect to A, however, depends on the level of A: For any given level of T (say
T0) there is a level of A (let us call it A0) which will make the partial deriv-
ative equal to zero. This is the situation where the distribution of resources
between domestic consumers (consuming V D = Y D − θDA) and the public
good (V P = Y P +θP (T +A) ) is optimal - in the sense that the welfare gain
resulting from the last dollar spent on the public good equals the welfare
loss resulting from the last dollar taxed away from domestic consumers. As
long as A ¿ A0 the partial derivative is positive because the welfare gain
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resulting from an extra dollar spent on the public good exceeds the welfare
loss caused by an extra dollar taxed away from domestic consumers. The op-
posite will be true if AÀ A0 and the partial derivative will be negative. An
exogenous increase in the contribution to the public good from the recipient
government, T , means that V P goes up and the welfare gain caused by the
last dollar spent on A is reduced. As a result, the level of A giving ∂W
D
∂A = 0
is reduced as well.
The slope of the indiﬀerence curve can now be found as
dA
dT
¯¯¯¯
WD
= −
∂WD
∂A
∂WD
∂T
= −
ρP θP
V P
ρP θP
V P
− ρDθD
V D
or more convenient in the (T,A) plane:
dT
dA
¯¯¯¯
WD
=
1
dA
dT
¯¯
WD
= −
ρP θP
V P
− ρDθD
VD
ρP θP
V P
Figure A1 about here
Three indiﬀerence curves have been drawn in figure A1. We start in a
situation where T = T0 and let A = A0 be the level of A where ∂W
D
∂A = 0. Let
WD0 symbolize the relevant indiﬀerence curve. Its slope equals zero when A =
A0. Assume that the recipient government’s contribution to the public good
increases by ∆T . There will be a welfare gain from the donor government’s
point of view. As a result, if the level of A remains unchanged its welfare
level will increase, meaning that another (higher and better) indiﬀerence
curve will be reached, symbolized by WD1 . For the welfare level to remain
unchanged, the level of A has to go either up ( by ∆A+ - meaning that the
welfare gain derived from the last dollar spent on the public good will become
lower than the welfare gain obtained from the last dollar spent on domestic
consumption) or down (by ∆A− - and the welfare gain derived from the last
dollar spent on the public good will become higher than the gain derived
from the last dollar spent on consumption). As a result, the slope of the
indiﬀerence curve in the (T,A) plane is negative when A¿ A0 and positive
when AÀ A0.
From the donor’s point of view the exogenous increase of T represents
an increase of V P , bringing the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on
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the public good below the last dollar spent on domestic consumption. As
a result, it is optimal to reduce the spending on the public good; A will be
reduced and the indiﬀerence curve WD2 is reached.
The recipient government’s indiﬀerence curves
Using the welfare function
WR =W
R
+ γR lnV R + γP lnV P (with γR + γP = 1)
the indiﬀerence curves of the recipient government can be derived in a similar
way as those of the donor government.
dWR =
∂WR
∂A
dA+
∂WR
∂T
dT = 0
where the partial derivatives are
∂WR
∂T
= − γ
R
V R
θR +
γP
V P
θP
∂WR
∂A
=
γP
V P
θP
The slope of the indiﬀerence curve
dT
dA
¯¯¯¯
WR
= −
∂WR
∂A
∂WR
∂T
= −
γP θP
V P
−γRθR
V R
+ γ
P θP
V P
Figure A2 about here
For a given level of A, for example A0, the slope tends to infinity when T
tends to T0 and ∂W
R
∂T tends to zero. The indiﬀerence curve has been illustrated
in figure A2 as WR0 . If A is increased by ∆A the welfare level goes up, see
WR1 . For the welfare level to remain the same, T has to increase (by ∆T+) or
decrease (by ∆T−). As a result, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve is positive
for T À T0 and negative if T ¿ T0.It will now be optimal for the recipient
government to reduce its contribution to the public good, see the indiﬀerence
curve WR2 .
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